SJS 44 (Rev. 12/07, NJ 5/08)

DATE

Case 2:11-cv-06582-GP Document 1 Filed 10/21/11 Page 1 of 11 CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil declered the states in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil declered the states in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil declered the states in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil declered the states in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil declered the civil de

the civil docket sheet. (SEE I	NSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)	•
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS		DEFENDANTS
KARI BERGEN		NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC.
(b) County of Residence	of First Listed Plaintiff	County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
Craig Thor Kimmel, E Kimmel & Silverman, 30 E. Butler Pike Ambler, PA 19002	•	NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED. Attorneys (If Known)
(215) 540-8888	NCTION (III) (III)	III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES(Place an "X" in One Box for Plaint
II. BASIS OF JURISI 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	DICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only) ▼ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)	(For Diversity Cases Only) PTF DEF Citizen of This State 1
☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant	☐ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)	Citizen of Another State
		Citizen or Subject of a
IV. NATURE OF SUI		
CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES
☐ 110 Insurance ☐ 120 Marine ☐ 130 Miller Act ☐ 140 Negotiable Instrument ☐ 150 Recovery of Overpayment	□ 330 Federal Employers' Liability □ 340 Marine □ 345 Marine Product Liability □ 370 Other Fraud □ 350 Motor Vehicle □ 355 Motor Vehicle □ 355 Motor Vehicle □ 360 Other Personal □ 360 Other Personal Injury □ 360 Other Personal Injury □ 371 Truth in Lending □ 380 Other Personal □ 700 Product Liability □ 385 Property Damage □ 470 Product Liability □ 385 Property Damage □ 441 Voting □ 411 Voting □ 441 Voting □ 442 Employment □ 443 Housing/ Accommodations □ 350 General □ 455 Death Penalty	
🕱 1 Original 🔲 🗀 2 Re	Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you at 15 U.S.C SECTION 1692	Appeal to District Reopened 5 Transferred from another district (specify) 6 Multidistrict Litigation 7 Magistrate Judgment 7 Transferred from Magistrate Judgment 7 Transferred from Magistrate Judgment 7 Transferred from Magistrate Judgment 8 Multidistrict Litigation 9 Transferred from Magistrate Judgment 9 Transferred from Magis
VII. REQUESTED IN	Fair Debt Collection Practices Ac	
COMPLAINT: VIII. RELATED CAS	UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 E(S)	JURY DEMAND: Ø Yes 🗆 No
Explanation:	(See instructions): JUDGE	DOCKET NUMBER
10-21-1		

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CASE MANAGEMENT TRACK DESIGNATION FORM

Kari Berge	<u> </u>	CIVIL ACTION			
NCO Financia	al Systems. Inc.	NO.			
In accordance with the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan of this court, counsel for plaintiff shall complete a Case Management Track Designation Form in all civil cases at the time of filing the complaint and serve a copy on all defendants. (See § 1:03 of the plan set forth on the reverse side of this form.) In the event that a defendant does not agree with the plaintiff regarding said designation, that defendant shall, with its first appearance, submit to the clerk of court and serve on the plaintiff and all other parties, a Case Management Track Designation Form specifying the track to which that defendant believes the case should be assigned.					
SELECT ONE OF THE F	OLLOWING CASE MANAGE	MENT TRACKS:			
(a) Habeas Corpus – Cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 through § 2255.					
(b) Social Security – Cases requesting review of a decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying plaintiff Social Security Benefits.					
(c) Arbitration – Cases required to be designated for arbitration under Local Civil Rule 53.2.					
(d) Asbestos – Cases involving claims for personal injury or property damage from exposure to asbestos.					
commonly referred to a	Cases that do not fall into tracks (s complex and that need special o side of this form for a detailed ex	r intense management by planation of special			
management cases.)					
(f) Standard Management -	- Cases that do not fall into any or	ne of the other tracks.	()		
	Craig Thoroximmel Attorney-at-law				
215 540-8888	877-788-2864	Kimme Ocreditlan	U. COM		
Tolonhone	FAY Number	F_Mail Address			

(Civ. 660) 10/02

Case 2:11-cv-065@ArGED SPOCKESEDISTREE CONTROL Page 3 of 11

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA — DESIGNATION FORM to be assignment to appropriate calendar.	e used by counsel to indicate the category of the case for the purpose of			
Address of Plaintiff: 32 KOV Dury Street, Hunt	myten Station, NY 11 146			
Address of Defendant: 507 Prudentral Road, Hursham PA 190414				
Place of Accident, Incident or Transaction:				
(Use Reverse Side For Ad	-			
Does this civil action involve a nongovernmental corporate party with any parent corporation ar				
(Attach two copies of the Disclosure Statement Form in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 7.1(a))	Yes No No			
Does this case involve multidistrict litigation possibilities?	Yes□ No□			
RELATED CASE, IF ANY:	D. D. J. J. J.			
Case Number: Judge	Date Terminated:			
Civil cases are deemed related when yes is answered to any of the following questions:				
1. Is this case related to property included in an earlier numbered suit pending or within one year	ar previously terminated action in this court?			
2. Does this case involve the same issue of fact or grow out of the same transaction as a prior su action in this court?				
	Yes No No			
3. Does this case involve the validity or infringement of a patent already in suit or any earlier many earlie				
terminated action in this court?	Yes□ No□			
4. Is this case a second or successive habeas corpus, social security appeal, or pro se civil rights	s case filed by the same individual?			
	Yes No No			
CIVIL: (Place ✓ in ONE CATEGORY ONLY)				
A. Federal Question Cases:	B. Diversity Jurisdiction Cases:			
1. ☐ Indemnity Contract, Marine Contract, and All Other Contracts	1. □ Insurance Contract and Other Contracts			
2. □ FELA	2. □ Airplane Personal Injury			
3. ☐ Jones Act-Personal Injury	3. □ Assault, Defamation			
4. □ Antitrust	4. □ Marine Personal Injury			
5. □ Patent	5. □ Motor Vehicle Personal Injury			
6. □ Labor-Management Relations	6. □ Other Personal Injury (Please			
	specify)			
7. □ Civil Rights	7. □ Products Liability			
8. □ Habeas Corpus	8. Products Liability — Asbestos			
9. □ Securities Act(s) Cases	9. □ All other Diversity Cases			
10. □ Social Security Review Cases	(Please specify)			
11. All other Federal Question Cases 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (Please specify)				
ARBITRATION CERTIF				
I, Check Appropriate Cat I, counsel of record do hereby certify Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 53.2, Section 3(c)(2), that to the best of my knowledge and b \$150,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs;	"			
Relief other than monetary damages is sought.				
DATE: 10-21-11 Craig Mur Kimmes	57100			
Agtorney-at-Law NOTE: A trial de novo will be a trial by jury only if there	Attorney I.D.# e has been compliance with F.R.C.P. 38.			
	-			
I certify that, to my knowledge, the within case is not related to any case now pending or we except as noted above.	ithin one year previously terminated action in this court			
DATE: 10-21-11 (raig Ther-Kimmel	57100			
Autorney-at-Law	Attorney I.D.#			
	·			

CIV. 609 (6/08)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KARI BERGREN,)
Plaintiff)
v.) Case No.:
NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC.,) COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR) JURY TRIAL
Defendant)

COMPLAINT

KARI BERGREN ("Plaintiff"), by and through her attorneys, KIMMEL & SILVERMAN, P.C., alleges the following against NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC. ("Defendant"):

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is based on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA").

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 2. Jurisdiction of this court arises pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), which states that such actions may be brought and heard before "any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy," and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants this court original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the laws of the United States.
- 3. Defendant has its corporate headquarters in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and as such, personal jurisdiction is established.
 - 4. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

PARTIES

- 5. Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Huntington Station, NY.
- 6. Plaintiff is a person granted a cause of action under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) and Wenrich v. Cole, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18687 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2000).
- 7. Defendant is a national debt collection company with its corporate headquarters located at 507 Prudential Road, Horsham, PA 19044.
- 8. Defendant is a "debt collector" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), and repeatedly contacted Plaintiff in an attempt to collect a debt.
- 9. Defendant acted through its agents, employees, officers, members, directors, heirs, successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, representatives, and insurers.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

- 11. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") is a comprehensive statute, which prohibits a catalog of activities in connection with the collection of debts by third parties.

 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The FDCPA imposes civil liability on any person or entity that violates its provisions, and establishes general standards of debt collector conduct, defines abuse, and provides for specific consumer rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.
- 12. The operative provisions of the FDCPA declare certain rights to be provided to or claimed by debtors, forbid deceitful and misleading practices, prohibit harassing and abusive tactics, and proscribe unfair or unconscionable conduct, both generally and in a specific list of disapproved practices.
- 13. In particular, the FDCPA broadly enumerates several practices considered contrary to its stated purpose, and forbids debt collectors from taking such action. The substantive heart of the FDCPA lies in three broad prohibitions. First, a "debt collector may not

engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Second, a "debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. And third, a "debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. The FDCPA is designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous collectors, whether or not there exists a valid debt, broadly prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection methods, conduct which harasses, oppresses or abuses any debtor, and any false, deceptive or misleading statements in connection with the collection of a debt.

- 14. In enacting the FDCPA, the United States Congress found that "[t]here is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors," which "contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. Congress additionally found existing laws and procedures for redressing debt collection injuries to be inadequate to protect consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b.
- 15. Congress enacted the FDCPA to regulate the collection of consumer debts by debt collectors. The express purposes of the FDCPA are to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 16. At all pertinent times hereto, Defendant was hired to collect a consumer debt and attempted to collect that debt from Plaintiff.
- 17. Upon information and belief, the debt arose out of transactions that were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
- 18. Beginning in or around August 2011, Defendant constantly and continuously called Plaintiff in its attempts to collect a debt from a "Diane Myers."
- 19. Defendant's calls originated from 1-800-334-0626, which the undersigned has confirmed belongs to Defendant.
- 20. Defendant contacted Plaintiff, on average, at least two (2) times a day, and sometimes as much as four (4) times a day.
- 21. Also, Defendant called her multiple days in a row, for example calling her on August 14, 2011; August 15, 2011; and August 16, 2011, which served no other purpose but to harass Plaintiff.
- 22. In addition to calling Plaintiff, Defendant also left multiple voice mail messages on her home answering machine.
- 23. In its voice mail messages, Defendant disclosed to Plaintiff that it was calling in an attempt to collect a debt from a "Diane Myers."
- 24. Desiring to put a stop to Defendant's repeated telephone calls, on more than one occasion, Plaintiff contacted Defendant and informed Defendant that she was not "Diane Myers" and that she did not know a "Diane Myers."
 - 25. Plaintiff instructed Defendant to stop calling her.
 - 26. Defendant, however, failed to update its records to avoid further harassment of

Plaintiff.

- 27. Instead, Defendant ignored Plaintiff's instructions and continued to contact her in its attempts to collect a debt from "Diane Myers."
- 28. Wanting the calls to stop, Plaintiff retained counsel to assist her in stopping Defendant's harassing debt collection calls.
- 29. In accordance with NCO's prior instructions regarding the undersigned's new cases, on August 23, 2011, notice of legal representation was sent electronic mail to NCO Financial, demanding that it cease and desist contacting Plaintiff except through counsel. See Exhibit A.
- 30. The transmittal by email of the above letter was requested by NCO Financial and its counsel to ensure that communications with consumers represented by the undersigned would cease within 24 hours of notice.
- 31. Defendant however did not cease and desist and thereafter called Plaintiff without her consent, on August 25, 2011, again asking to speak with a "Diane Myers."
- 32. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed each time it called, to adequately and reasonably investigate and/or verify information of its debtor prior to calling Plaintiff.
- 33. Defendant called Plaintiff on a repetitive basis with the intent to harass Plaintiff into paying an alleged debt, even if it knew that Plaintiff was not the debtor.
- 34. The repetitive calls to Plaintiff were intended by Defendant to be disturbing, harassing, and an invasion of privacy.

CONSTRUCTION OF APPLICABLE LAW

35. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. <u>Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand</u>, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997). "Because the Act imposes strict liability, a consumer

need not show intentional conduct by the debt collector to be entitled to damages." Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F. 3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp., 233 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding unintentional misrepresentation of debt collector's legal status violated FDCPA); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F. 2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).

- 36. The FDCPA is a remedial statute, and therefore must be construed liberally in favor of the debtor. Sprinkle v. SB&C Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (W.D. Wash. 2006). The remedial nature of the FDCPA requires that courts interpret it liberally. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F. 3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006). "Because the FDCPA, like the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 15 U.S.C §1601 et seq., is a remedial statute, it should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer." Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F. 3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002).
- 37. The FDCPA is to be interpreted in accordance with the "least sophisticated" consumer standard. See Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Cir. 1985); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F. 2d 107 (3rd Cir. 1991); Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988). The FDCPA was not "made for the protection of experts, but for the public that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, and the fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less experienced." Id. The least sophisticated consumer standard serves a dual purpose in that it ensures protection of all consumers, even naive and trusting, against deceptive collection practices, and protects collectors against liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices. Clomon, 988 F. 2d at 1318.

COUNT I DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

- 38. In its actions to collect a debt, Defendant violated the FDCPA in one or more of the following ways:
 - a. Defendant violated the FDCPA generally;
 - b. Defendant violated §1692b(2) of the FDCPA when it disclosed to Plaintiff that a third party owed a debt;
 - c. Defendant violated §1692b(3) of the FDCPA when it contacted Plaintiff more than once about another person's debt;
 - d. Defendant violated §1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA when it communicated with Plaintiff after it knew she was represented by an attorney;
 - e. Defendant violated §1692c(b) of the FDCPA when it communicated with Plaintiff about another person's debt;
 - f. Defendant violated §1692c(c) of the FDCPA when it communicated with Plaintiff about a debt after it received written notice to cease communication;
 - g. Defendant violated §1692d of the FDCPA when it harassed, oppressed or abused Plaintiff in connection with the collection of a debt;
 - h. Defendant violated §1692d(5) of the FDCPA when caused Plaintiff's phone to ring, and engaged Plaintiff in conversation repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass Plaintiff; and
 - i. Defendant violated §1692f of the FDCPA when it used unfair and unconscionable means in connection with the collection of a debt.

case.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, KARI BERGREN, respectfully prays for a judgment as follows:

- a. All actual damages suffered pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);
- b. Statutor y damages of \$1,000.00 for the violation of the FDCPA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A);
- c. All reasonable attorneys' fees, witness fees, court costs and other litigation costs incurred by Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693k(a)(3); and
- d. Any other relief deemed appropriate by this Honorable Court.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff, KARI BERGREN, demands a jury trial in this

Date: 10 24

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

By:

Craig Thor Kimmel Attorney ID No. 57100 Tara L. Patterson

Attorney ID No. 88343 Kimmel & Silverman, P.C.

30 E. Butler Pike Ambler, PA 19002

Phone: (215) 540-8888 Fax: (877) 788-2864

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Email: <u>kimmel@creditlaw.com</u>
Email: <u>tpatterson@creditlaw.com</u>